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NOTES
"Standing" Up for Minority Coworkers? White Males Do Not
Have "Aggrieved Person" Standing for Hostile Environment
Actions Under Childress v. City of Richmond
The work of police officers in a city police precinct can be
hazardous, requiring not only constant alertness but also close
cooperation with and dependence on coworkers. When a supervisor,
a white male, makes disparaging and abusive remarks about minority
police officers, sometimes only in the presence of white officers, but
other times in front of the assembled workforce, it is arguable
whether workforce morale could decline as a result of these remarks.
The minority coworkers may be angered by the supervisor's remarks
and begin to resent their white male coworkers because they belong
to the supervisor's race and gender or because they are not the object
of his remarks. The question with respect to this situation is whether
a "hostile environment" has been created that may fall within the
prohibitions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,1 and if so,
whether white male officers have standing to sue in federal court to
try to change the situation.
In Childress v. City of Richmond,2 the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals, sitting en banc, held that seven white male police officers
did not have standing to assert a hostile environment claim under
Title VII when discriminatory conduct was directed at AfricanAmerican or female police officers in the same precinct. The court
reversed a decision by a three-judge panel of the court, which had
concluded that the white male officers did have standing to assert
such a claim, and upheld a district court decision dismissing the
officers' hostile environment and other claims.4 With this reversal,
the court indicated its view of who qualifies as a "person claiming to
be aggrieved ...by [an] alleged unlawful employment practice"5 for

1. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 701-718, 78 Stat. 241, 253-66
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-15 (1994)).
2. 134 F.3d 1205 (4th Cir. 1998) (en banc) (per curiam), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 2322
(1998).
3. See id. at 1207-08.
4. See id.
5. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1).
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plaintiffs who are not part of the "protected class"'6 being
discriminated against, but who claim a hostile working environment

because of discrimination against employees within that protected
class. This view runs counter to the holdings of four other federal
circuits7 and raises questions about how the Fourth Circuit will treat
actions brought under Title VII by third parties not within a
protected class.
Although the case presented to the court in Childressmay seem
unusual, one commentator has noted that it is not uncommon for
whites to claim to be aggrieved persons8 under Title VII for

6. The term "protected class" generally refers to persons against whom
discrimination is prohibited under Title VII because of their race, color, sex, religion, or
national origin. See id. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
7. See Stewart v. Hannon, 675 F.2d 846, 850 (7th Cir. 1982) (noting that a white
female teacher had standing as a "person aggrieved" by discriminatory acts against
African-American and Hispanic coworkers); EEOC v. Mississippi College, 626 F.2d 477,
483 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding that white female college instructor could bring a Title VII
action based on discrimination against African-American coworkers for "violation of her
own personal right to work in an environment unaffected by racial discrimination");
EEOC v. Bailey Co., 563 F.2d 439, 454 (6th Cir. 1977) (holding that a white female
employee had standing to bring claim of discrimination for discriminatory acts directed at
African-American females); Waters v. Heublein, Inc., 547 F.2d 466, 469 (9th Cir. 1976)
(concluding that a white female had standing to sue based on discrimination for
discriminatory acts directed at African-American and Hispanic employees).
One of these circuits recently indicated that it may be leaning away from such a
broad interpretation of standing for aggrieved persons under Title VII. In Bermudez v.
TRC Holdings, Inc., 138 F.3d 1176 (7th Cir. 1998), the Seventh Circuit rejected a claim by
a white female worker that an actionable hostile working environment had been created
by racially discriminatory actions of her coworkers or supervisors against AfricanAmerican job applicants. See id. at 1181. The plaintiff claimed that a hostile working
environment had been created because a supervisor had yelled at her. See id. at 1179.
She alternatively claimed that a hostile working environment had been created because
fellow employees discriminated against blacks themselves or did so to satisfy client
preferences to the extent that employees of "any race or sex who were opposed to
discrimination felt uncomfortable." Id. at 1180. The court noted that it had "never
recognized [uncomfortableness] as a valid theory of discrimination under Title VII," and
that it was difficult to reconcile the theory "with the proposition that laws must be
enforced by the victims (or by public prosecutors) rather than by third parties discomfited
by the violations." Id. The court distinguished its holding in Stewart, commenting that
the loss suffered by the white employee in that case-" 'the loss of important benefits
from interracial associations' "--waspersonal and was not the same as "[a]n adverse
reaction to observing someone else's injury." Id. (quoting Stewart, 675 F.2d at 850). It
should be noted, however, that the court did not decide the plaintiff's claim in Bermudez
on "whether the approach of cases such as Stewart translates to claims of derivative
hostile working environments," but rather that the plaintiff's complaint of being yelled at
did not create a hostile environment. Id. at 1181.
8. Although the exact phrase in Title VII regarding who may bring a private
enforcement action is "the person claiming to be aggrieved," 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1),
the phrase "aggrieved person" is used throughout this Note for the sake of brevity.
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discrimination directed against African-Americans.9
It is less
common, but not unheard of, for males to bring Title VII actions for
discriminatory practices against females. 10 Three theories have been
advanced in support of these claims:
(1) Title VII should be
construed broadly to allow any person to bring an action for
discrimination against another; (2) the discrimination against a
particular protected class creates an adverse working environment
that harms all employees; and (3) the person claiming to be aggrieved
is injured because of her support of members of a protected class in a
discrimination action." The white male police officers in Childress
appeared to advance the second theory-that racial and gender
discrimination against African-American and female officers
"deprived them of an environment unaffected by ...
discrimination." 2
The success of male plaintiffs in obtaining standing for claims of
3
discrimination against female coworkers varies among the circuits;
thus, the Fourth Circuit's decision affirming the dismissal of the male
officers' claim for lack of standing on a gender discrimination basis is
not necessarily inconsistent with other federal court decisions. What

9. See 2 BARBARA LINDEMANN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 1292

(3d ed. 1996).
10. See, e.g., Allen v. American Home Foods, Inc., 644 F. Supp. 1553, 1555 (N.D. Ind.
1986) (involving allegations by male plaintiffs that they may assert a claim under Title VII
based on sex for employer's discriminatory actions against females in closing a
predominantly female plant); Pecorella v. Oak Orchard Community Health Ctr., Inc., 559
F. Supp. 147, 149 (W.D.N.Y. 1982) (involving a male job applicant's Title VII claim that
an employer engaged in sex discrimination by offering him a higher wage than a female
employee).
11. See 2 LINDEMANN ET AL., supra note 9, at 1292.
12. 2 id. at 1293.
13. See Mary Anne C. Case, DisaggregatingGenderfrom Sex and Sexual Orientation:
The Effeminate Man in the Law and FeministJurisprudence,105 YALE L.J. 1, 78 & n.265

(1995) (commenting on the split in federal courts on the issue of whether men have
standing to bring Title VII actions for discrimination against women); N. Morrison
Torrey, Indirect Discrimination Under Title VII: Expanding Male Standing to Sue for
Injuries Received as a Result of Employer DiscriminationAgainst Females,64 WASH. L.

REV. 365, 366 (1989) (noting that federal cases differ on whether men have standing to
bring Title VII actions for discrimination against women). Professor Torrey contends:
Conflicting decisions such as these highlight the question of who has standing to
protest sex discrimination-a question that gains particular importance in the
context of Title VII because that statute is enforced primarily by private
plaintiffs. Adverse standing decisions prevent any hearing on the merits of a
discrimination charge. Thus, when injured males are denied standing because
they are not the direct target of discrimination, a technicality is allowed to
frustrate Title VII's central purpose: to eradicate discrimination in the
workplace.
Id. (footnote omitted).

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 77

is interesting, given the precedent in other jurisdictions, 14 is the
court's refusal to grant standing to the white officers based on racial
discrimination.
This Note examines the facts of Childress and reviews the
opinion of the district court, the Fourth Circuit panel decision, and
the Fourth Circuit's en banc opinion. The Note briefly reviews the
statutory framework pertaining to Title VII discrimination actions
and the determination of standing for aggrieved persons, 6 as well as
the precedent in Supreme Court and federal circuit decisions
addressing standing for persons outside a protected class.' 7 Finally,
the Note analyzes the Fourth Circuit's decision in light of the
statutory framework and case law. 8
In Childress, seven white male and two white female Richmond
police officers filed suit against the City of Richmond, Virginia, and
the City's chief of police in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia. 19 The officers sought relief under
federal and state law for what they claimed was a hostile working
environment created by the racially and sexually discriminatory
actions of their precinct supervisor." They claimed that: (1) the
supervisor's disparaging comments about African-American and
female police officers in the precinct created a hostile environment in
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (the "Act");21 (2) their
efforts to bring a complaint about the supervisor's actions to the
police department leaders, and their subsequent efforts to file hostile
environment charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission ("EEOC"), resulted in retaliatory action against them in
violation of § 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1 87 1 ;fl and (3) the City
14. See supra note 7 and accompanying text; see also EEOC v. T.I.M.E.-D.C. Freight,
659 F.2d 690, 691-93 (5th Cir. 1981) (per curiam) (noting that white truck drivers were
aggrieved persons under Title VII because discrimination against African-American truck
drivers created a discriminatory work environment); Bartelson v. Dean Witter Co., 86
F.R.D. 657, 665 (E.D.N.Y. 1980) (granting white female standing to sue for
discriminatory actions against blacks).
15. See infranotes 19-65 and accompanying text.
16. See infranotes 66-89 and accompanying text.
17. See infranotes 90-154 and accompanying text.
18. See infranotes 155-84 and accompanying text.
19. See Childress v. City of Richmond, 907 F. Supp. 934, 937 (E.D. Va. 1995), affd in
part, rev'd in part, 120 F.3d 476 (4th Cir. 1997), reh'g en banc granted, opinion vacated,
ruling affd by an equally divided court, 134 F.3d 1205 (4th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 118 S.
Ct. 2322 (1998).
20. See id.
21. See id. at 937-38.

22. See id. at 940-42. Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, see 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (1994), "creates an action [for employees] for damages and injunctive relief' for
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violated Virginia public policy regarding unlawful employment
discrimination.'
In their suit, the officers alleged that over a two-month period,
their supervisor, a white male, made several highly derogatory
remarks about African-American and female police officers under

his command, either in the presence of only white officers or in front
of all members of the force.24 In January 1994, the officers filed a

complaint letter with the precinct captain that questioned the
supervisor's mental stability, claiming that he was "emotionally out
of control, extremely verbally abusive, and given to alarming
outbursts of temper and profanity."' The complaint did not mention
any discriminatory actions.2 6 The officer who presented the letter to

the

captain, however,

allegedly

mentioned

the

supervisor's

discriminatory remarks at the time he filed the letter. 7 The police

department's leaders conducted an investigation of the charges but
did not take any action against the supervisor.' The complaining
officers claimed that they were threatened with termination by police
leadership during the investigation and that certain complaining
officers later received poor performance evaluations or transfers. 29
In March and April of 1994, the officers filed hostile environment
violations of "(1) property interest procedural due process, (2) liberty interest procedural
due process, (3) substantive due process, (4) equal protection, (5) free speech, (6)
freedom of association, (7) searches and seizures, and (8) right of privacy." Harvey
Brown & Sarah V. Kerrigan, 42 U.S.C. §1983: The Vehicle for Protecting Public
Employees' ConstitutionalRights, 47 BAYLOR L. REv. 619, 621 (1995).
23. See Childress,907 F. Supp. at 941-42.
24. See id. at 937-38. The district court opinion graphically described the comments
supposedly made by the supervisor, Lieutenant Carroll, toward and about the AfricanAmerican and female officers on the precinct force:
In November or December 1993.... Carroll [allegedly] said to three female
officers "Well, I see all my bitches are here, it must not be that time of the
month." On December 16, 1993,... Carroll [allegedly] noted with obvious
approval that an all-white, all-male roll call of officers was "like it used to be."
On January 3, 1994.... Carroll [allegedly] called female officers his "pussy
posse" and "vaginal vigilantes" in the presence of both male and female officers.
Early in 1994.... one of the officer's wives called Carroll and then [allegedly]
heard him say in the background that a black female officer was a "motherfucking worthless black bitch," a "no good black bitch" and a "most useless
nigger."

Id.
25. Id. at 938.
26. See id.
27. See Childress v. City of Richmond, 120 F.3d 476, 478 (4th Cir. 1997), reh'g en
banc granted,opinion vacated, ruling affd by an equally divided court, 134 F.3d 1205 (4th
Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 2322 (1998).
28. See Childress,907 F. Supp. at 938.
29. See id.
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charges with the EEOC and, subsequently, received right-to-sue

letters" from the agency.3 ' The officers allegedly were subjected to
further retaliatory actions after they filed the charges, prompting
them to file a claim of retaliation with the EEOC.32 The officers also
received fight-to-sue letters for the retaliation claims.3 In August
1995, the nine officers sued in district court. 34 Their primary claim
was that the derogatory remarks made by their supervisor created a
hostile working environment that "acted to destroy the necessary
sense of 'teamwork' between officers of different sexes and races, and
that this resultant loss of teamwork raised the possibility that officers
in one group might be reluctant to assist officers in another group
during the performance of their duties." 35

The district court dismissed the white male officers' hostile
environment claim, stating that they did not have standing under
Title VII of the Act to recover for violations of the civil rights of
others.36 The court noted that a person generally does not have a
right to state a civil rights claim for another and can only allege that
he she has been deprived of a right provided by the Constitution or
federal law.37 With regard to the officers' gender-based claims, the
district court determined that they had not been intentionally
discriminated against because the officers were of the same gender as
their supervisor and, consequently, were not within a protected class
under Title VII.3s
The court reviewed the officers' hostile
30. A person may file an action under Title VII after receiving a right-to-sue letter
from the EEOC. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1994). The EEOC may issue right-to-sue
letters if it dismisses the charge or if it has not initiated an action or reached a settlement
agreement to which the aggrieved individual is a party. See id. A person cannot proceed
with an individual suit until the EEOC has determined that no reasonable cause exists to
believe a violation has occurred or it is unable to reach a conciliation agreement with the
entity charged with the violation and the agency no longer has jurisdiction. See MACK A.
PLAYER, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW § 5.75(a) (1988).
31. See Childress,120 F.3d at 478.
32. See id.
33. See id.
34. See id.
35. Id.
36. See Childress v. City of Richmond, 907 F. Supp. 934, 939-40 (E.D. Va. 1995), aff'd
in part,rev'd in part, 120 F.3d 476 (4th Cir. 1997), reh'g en banc granted,opinion vacated,
rulingaffjd by an equally divided court, 134 F.3d 1205 (4th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 118 S.
Ct. 2322 (1998). The court did find, however, that the female plaintiffs had stated a claim
for a hostile environment for gender discrimination pursuant to Title VII and thus had
standing to pursue their discrimination claims. See id. at 940. The two female officers
settled prior to final judgment and their claims were dismissed. See Childress, 120 F.3d at
479 n.2.
37. See Childress,907 F. Supp. at 939.
38. See id. Senior District Judge Richard L. Williams wrote the district court's
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environment claim under a gender discrimination analysis using
same-sex harassment cases decided by Fourth Circuit courts as
"persuasive authority" for its analysis. 9 It held that "Title VII
permits no claim for hostile environment based on same-sex
harassment where there is neither an allegation of quid pro quo nor
some sexual component of the harassing behavior."4 Because the
white male officers were asserting the rights of others (in this
instance, female officers) and because they did not allege a quid pro
quo nor sexual component to the harassment, the court held that they
could not state a hostile environment claim based on gender
discrimination. 41 The court also held that the white officers (both
male and female) did not have standing to assert a race-based claim
of a hostile environment because they were attempting to assert a
Title VII claim based on either "the civil rights of others or ... that

they were discriminated against by being provided disparate and
better treatment than their black peers. 42 Finally, the court
dismissed the § 1983 claims for failure to state a cause of action 43 and
also dismissed the state public policy claim because the officers could
not state a public policy right of action.'
On appeal, a three-judge panel of the Fourth Circuit upheld the
district court's dismissal of the § 1983 and state public policy claims 45
but vacated and remanded the decision that the white male police
officers did not have standing under Title VII to bring a hostile
environment claim based on the discriminatory treatment of AfricanAmerican or female coworkers. 46 The panel noted that in enacting
Title VII of the Act, "Congress conferred a private right of action on
'the person claiming to be aggrieved ...by the alleged unlawful

employment practice.' ""4 To determine whether the white male
officers in this case were persons claiming to be aggrieved and thus
had standing to bring a hostile environment claim, the panel relied on
the Supreme Court's reasoning in Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life

opinion. See id. at 937.
39. See id.
40. Id.
41. See id. at 939-40.
42. Id. at 940.
43. See id. at 941.
44. See id. at 942-43.
45. See Childress,120 F.3d at 483. Judge Hall delivered the opinion for the panel in
which Judge Michael and Senior Judge Phillips joined. See id. at 477.
46. See id. at 483.
47. Id. at 480-81 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(5)(f)(1) (1994)).

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 77

Insurance Co.'s According to the Childresspanel, the Supreme Court
in Trafficante noted that " 'the loss of important benefits from
interracial associations'

"'

was sufficient injury to allow white

housing tenants to bring claims as aggrieved persons under the fair
housing provisions of Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 196811 for
housing practices discriminating against African-American tenants.
The panel noted that in Trafficante the Supreme Court explicitly
applied a broad construction of the term "aggrieved person" so that
Title VIII would reflect "'"a congressional intention to define
standing as broadly as is permitted by Article III of the
Constitution," ' "51 and that the Court implicitly had applied a similar

construction to Title VII claims.5 2 Buttressed by a finding that other
circuit courts considering "the issue of a white person's standing to
sue under Title VII for associational or hostile environment claims
flowing from [discrimination against] black persons" had applied the
broad Trafficante construction of standing to permit the white
plaintiff to bring a claim,53 the panel held that Trafficante and these
circuit court decisions compelled the conclusion that "white men
have standing to assert hostile environment claims under Title VII
when the discriminatory conduct is directed at blacks or females. '54
The panel also vacated and remanded the district court's decision
5
dismissing the officers' retaliation claims.
The Fourth Circuit vacated the panel decision by a majority vote
and ordered that the officers' appeal be reheard en banc. 6 In a per
curiam opinion, the en banc court affirmed the district court's
judgment in its entirety, although it affirmed the district court's
dismissal of the hostile environment and retaliation claims by an
equally divided vote of the members of the court." The court did not
48. 409 U.S. 205 (1972).
49. Childress,120 F.3d at 480 (quoting Trafficante,409 U.S. at 210).
50. See Fair Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 90-284, Title VIII, 82 Stat. 81, 81-89 (1968)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619).
51. Childress,120 F.3d at 480 (quoting Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 209 (quoting Hackett
v. McGuire Bros., 445 F.2d 442,446 (3d Cir. 1971))).
52. See id. at 481.

53. Id. (citing Stewart v. Hannon, 675 F.2d 846, 848-50 (7th Cir. 1982); EEOC v.

Mississippi College, 626 F.2d 477, 481-83 (5th Cir. 1980); EEOC v. Bailey Co., 563 F.2d

439, 452-54 (6th Cir. 1977); Waters v. Heublein, Inc., 547 F.2d 466, 469-70 (9th Cir.
1976)).
54. Id.
55. See id. at 483.
56. See Childress,134 F.3d at 1207.
57. See id. at 1207-08. The case was argued before Chief Judge Wilkinson, Judges
Widener, Murnaghan, Ervin, Wilkins, Niemeyer, Hamilton, Luttig, Williams, Michael,
and Motz, and Senior Circuit Judge Phillips. See id. at 1206.
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explicitly set out its reasoning for affirming the district court
decisions.5 8 In a concurring opinion, however, Judge Luttig, joined by
Judges Wilkins and Williams, indicated that the panel's reading of
Trafficante, in reversing the district court's decision, was misplaced.5 9
Judge Luttig agreed that the Trafficante Court had broadly
interpreted the phrase "persons adversely affected or aggrieved" in
Title VIII to mean "any person genuinely injured by conduct that
violates anyone's rights under [Title VIII]."6° In contrast, he noted
that Congress had not specifically defined this phrase with regard to
Title VII, thus leaving the determination of standing for third parties
under Title VII to be tested under a " 'term of art' definition of
'aggrieved person.' "61 As a result, persons bringing a claim under
Title VII had to satisfy prudential standing limitations rather than
being able to take advantage of the broad standing granted by
Congress under Title VIII.62 Using this reasoning, Judge Luttig
agreed with the court's affirmation of the district court's decisions.63
In 1964, Congress enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.61 Title VII provides that it is unlawful for an employer "to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of such
individual's

race,

color,

religion,

sex,

or

national

origin."65

Additionally, an employer cannot discriminate against an employee
in a manner that would "deprive or tend to deprive any individual of
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as
an employee" because of these characteristics.66 Title VII authorizes
a private right of action by "the person claiming to be aggrieved ...
by the alleged unlawful employment practice."'6 7 To bring a Title VII
enforcement action as an aggrieved person, an individual must meet
specific standing requirements. These requirements involve the
procedural duties of filing a charge of discrimination with the
EEOC 8 and, if the agency does not pursue an enforcement action or
58. See id.
59. See id. at 1209 (Luttig, J., concurring).
60. Id. (Luttig, J., concurring).
61. Id. at 1210 (Luttig, J., concurring).
62. See id. at 1209-10 (Luttig, J., concurring).
63. See id. at 1211 (Luttig, J., concurring).
64. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 701-718, 78 Stat. 241, 253-66
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-15 (1994)).

65. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
66. Id. § 2000e-2(a)(2).
67. Id. § 2000e-5(f)(1).
68. See id. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (requiring employees to file an unlawful employment
practice charge with the EEOC within 180 days after the alleged practice occurred);
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efforts with the alleged

discriminator, filing a court action upon receipt of a right-to-sue
letter from the EEOC.69 In addition to these statutory requirements,
case law requires the person to meet constitutional and, in some
instances, prudential elements of the standing doctrine as applied by
the Supreme Court.7
In order to meet the constitutional standing requirements of

Article 111,71 a plaintiff bringing a private action must: (1) suffer an
injury in fact, meaning an invasion of a legally-protected interest that
Valerie L. Jacobson, Note, Bringinga Title VII Action: Which Test Regarding Standing to
Sue is the Most Applicable?, 18 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 95, 105 (1990).
69. See id. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (authorizing a person to bring a private action against an
alleged discriminator within 90 days after receiving a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC);
Jacobsen, supra note 68, at 105; see also supra note 30 (discussing right-to-sue letters).
70. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) ("Though some
of [the standing doctrine's] elements express merely prudential considerations that are
part of judicial self-government, the core component of standing is an essential and
unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III."); Warth v. Seldin,
422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975) (stating that the "inquiry [into the question of standing] involves
both constitutional limitations on federal-court jurisdiction and prudential limitations on
its exercise"); see also Torrey, supra note 13, at 384 (noting that "a plaintiff under Title
VII must satisfy the article III test for standing and, arguably, even the prudential zone of
interests test"); Jacobson, supra note 68, at 105 (commenting that a plaintiff in a Title VII
action also must meet a "zone of interests" prudential standing limitation). One
commentator has noted:
Despite the fact that the Supreme Court has made clear that the "zone of
interests" test is a prudential barrier, and not part of the Article III
requirements, the Eighth Circuit has specifically applied, and the Second Circuit
has affirmed, precisely that test in assessing Title VII standing. Of equal
importance, the courts have ruled as if various prudential barriers impeded the
standing of Title VII plaintiffs.
Michael E. Rosman, Standing Alone: Standing Under the FairHousing Act, 60 MO. L.
REV. 547, 563 (1995) (footnotes omitted). In Hackett v. McGuire Bros., 445 F.2d 442 (3d
Cir. 1971), however, the court stated:
The national public policy ... in Title VII ... may not be frustrated by the
development of overly technical judicial doctrines of standing.... If the plaintiff
is sufficiently aggrieved so that he claims enough injury in fact to present a
genuine case or controversy in the Article III sense, then he should have
standing to sue ....
Id. at 446-47; see also Shannon E. Brown, Note, Tester Standing Under Title VII, 49
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1117, 1125 (1992) ("Congress has directed federal courts to
disregard prudential concerns when analyzing standing under Title VII."); Jeffrey M.
Fisher, Note, In the Wake of Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, Inc.: InterpretingTitle VIi's
Statute of Limitationsfor FaciallyNeutral Seniority Systems, 1990 U. ILL. L. REV. 711,728
(stating that "prudential limitations do not apply in Title VII standing cases").
71. Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution provides that "[t]he judicial Power shall
extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under the Constitution, [and] the Laws of
the United States.... ; to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party; to
Controversies between two or more States; between a State and Citizens of another State;
[and] between Citizens of different States." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
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is concrete72 and "'actual or imminent' ";73 (2) show a causal
connection between the injury and the conduct complained of;74 and
(3) show that it is likely that a favorable judicial decision will redress
the injury.'
In addition, courts may impose prudential limits on
standing, including requirements that the plaintiff's interest be within
a "zone of interest" protected or regulated by the particular statute 76
or that the plaintiff seek only to defend her own rights and not those
of others.
Congress may override these prudential limitations,
however, by statutorily conferring standing to the full extent of
Article 111.78
Courts and the EEOC have long recognized that the phrase
"terms, conditions, or privileges of employment" in Title VII's
prohibition against employment discrimination is an "expansive
concept which sweeps within its protective ambit the practice of
creating a working environment heavily charged with ethnic or racial
discrimination '79 as well as sexual discrimination."
Courts have
applied this broad interpretation-that a "hostile" or "abusive"
working environment may be created by an employer's
discriminatory actions-in cases involving all of the protected classes
under Title VII. x
72- See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (citing Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 756 (1984);
Warth, 422 U.S. at 508; Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727,740-41 n.16 (1972)).
73. Id. (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149,155 (1990)).
74. See id. at 560-61 (citing Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26,
41-42 (1976)). The Court interpreted this causal connection to mean "the injury has to be
'fairly ... trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and not... th[e] result[l
[of] the independent action of some third party not before the court.' " Id. at 560
(alteration in original) (quoting Simon, 426 U.S. at 41-42).
75. See id. at 561 (citing Simon, 426 U.S. at 38, 43).
76. See Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153
(1970).
77. See Warth, 422 U.S. at 499. One commentator has noted that "[t]he courts have
imposed prudential limitations on themselves to preserve judicial resources for their most
important functions." Leroy D. Clark, Employment DiscriminationTesting: Theories of
Standing and a Reply to Professor Yelnosky, 28 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1, 9 (1994).
78. See Simon, 426 U.S. at 58-60 (Brennan, J., concurring); Clark, supra note 77, at 9.
79. Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234,238 (5th Cir. 1971).
80. See, e.g., Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57,73 (1986) (holding that sexual
discrimination may create a hostile environment); 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1997)
(providing EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, which define sexual
harassment to include conduct creating a hostile working environment).
81. See, e.g., Compston v. Borden, Inc., 424 F. Supp. 157, 160-61 (S.D. Ohio 1976)
(religious discrimination); 29 C.F.R. § 1606.8(b)(1) (providing EEOC Guidelines on
Discrimination Because of National Origin, which define harassment based on national
origin to include conduct creating a hostile environment); supra notes 79-80 (noting
hostile environment cases involving racial or sexual discrimination). In Crawford v.
Medina GeneralHospital, 96 F.3d 830 (6th Cir. 1996), the Sixth Circuit allowed a hostile
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In Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.,82 for example, the Supreme
Court noted that "[w]hen the workplace is permeated with
'discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult' that is 'sufficiently
severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment
and create an abusive working environment,' Title VII is violated."'83
The Court concluded that if conduct does not create an environment
that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive, or that the
person who is the subject of the conduct does not perceive to be
abusive, then Title VII is not violated. 84 Determining what
constitutes a hostile environment, however, "can be [performed] only
by looking at all the circumstances. These may include the frequency
of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically
threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and
whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work
performance."' The Court in Harris also indicated that it would
apply a similar standard to hostile environment claims based on
racial, gender, national origin, or religious discrimination.86
Despite what appears to be an established series of cases setting
out the test for determining standing in Title VII actions,
commentators have noted that the determination of whether an

individual plaintiff has standing is a flexible decision that the courts
environment cause of action under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967
("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994 & Supp. 1995), an anti-discrimination statute that
closely parallels Title VII. See Crawford, 96 F.3d at 834. But see Bums v. AAF-McQuay,
980 F. Supp. 175, 180 (W.D. Va. 1997) (declining to follow Crawford).
82. 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
83. Id. at 21 (citations omitted) (quoting Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65, 67). The Harris
Court reaffirmed the holding of Meritor that "hostile environment sexual harassment is
actionable, but circumscribed the kind of conduct that would be actionable to conduct
that is severe or pervasive enough to create a work environment that can 'reasonably be
perceived, and is perceived, as hostile or abusive,' even if no psychological harm results."
Alan M. Koral, CriticalDecisions in the Investigation of a Sex Harassment Claim: Practice
Pointers and Case Law Update, in AVOIDING AND LITIGATING SEXUAL HARASSMENT
CLAIMS 1998, 129, 137 (PLI Lit. & Admin. Prac. Course Handbook Series No. HO-0017,
June 1998) (quoting Harris,510 U.S. at 22). For further discussion of the relation of
Harris and Meritor, see Anita Bernstein, Treating Sexual Harassment with Respect, 111
HARV. L. REV. 445,448 & n.16 (1997); Kimberley McCreight, Callfor Consistency: Title
VII and Same-Sex Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment, 1 U. PA. J. LAB. &
EMPLOYMENT L. 269, 271-72 (1998); Catherine M. Maraist, Note, Faragher v. City of
Boca Raton: An Analysis of the Subjective Perception Test Required by Harris v. Forklift
Systems, Inc., 57 LA. L. REV. 1343, 1347-52 (1997).
84. See Harris,510 U.S. at 21-22.
85. Id. at 23.
86. See id. at 21-22; see also Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 180
(1989) (noting that the Court's interpretation of what constitutes a sexually hostile
environment in Meritor implicitly approved of a similar interpretation for a racially
hostile environment).
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have struggled to implement.

7

Complicating this struggle is a

disagreement as to whether Congress, in enacting Title VII, intended

to extend standing for aggrieved persons to the full extent of
constitutional limits.'

With regard to whether white employees have

standing under Title VII to bring a claim for discrimination against
African-American

employees,

however,

the

courts

and

administrative agencies have been relatively uniform in ruling that
prerequisites for standing exist.89 Courts that have recognized
87. See, e.g., Clark, supra note 77, at 7 ("Scholars have found the Supreme Court's
development of the law of standing to be unsatisfactory."); Rosman, supra note 70, at 550
("It is hard to read any significant number of cases or articles about standing without
coming to the conclusion that few [courts] hold the internal coherence of that doctrine in
high regard.").
88. See supra text accompanying note 70 (describing the controversy over whether
Title VII standing for third parties should be given to the full extent of Article III). For
examples of court decisions indicating that Title VII standing should be broadly
construed, see Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209 (1972)
(quoting with approval the holding of Hackett v. McGuire Bros., 445 F.2d 442 (3d Cir.
1971) and concluding that broad standing should be applied in actions under the Fair
Housing Act), and Hackett, 445 F.2d at 446 (commenting that the use of the phrase
"person claiming to be aggrieved" in Title VII indicated that Congress intended standing
to be defined "as broadly as is permitted by Article III of the Constitution"). See also
Gillian K. Hadfield, Rational Women: A Test for Sex-Based Harassment,83 CAL. L. REV.
1151, 1183 n.114 (1995) (citing numerous cases to support the proposition that the
"provisions of Title VII governing standing to sue are to be construed as broadly as
permissible under Article III of the United States Constitution"). For an example of a
case applying a narrow construction of standing under Title VII, see Fair Employment
Council of GreaterWashington, Inc. v. BMC Marketing Corp., 28 F.3d 1268, 1281 (D.C.
Cir. 1994) (holding that independent fair employment "testers" posing as job applicants
do not have standing under Title VII). But see Jonathan Levy, Comment, In Response to
Fair Employment Council of Greater Washington, Inc. v. BMC Marketing Corp.:
Employment Testers Do Have a Leg to Stand On, 80 MINN. L. REV. 123, 159-64 (1995)
(criticizing the FairEmployment Councilcourt for narrowly construing Title VII standing
provisions as applied to employment testers).
89. See, e.g., Stewart v. Hannon, 675 F.2d 846, 850 (7th Cir. 1982); EEOC v. Bailey
Co., 563 F.2d 439, 454 (6th Cir. 1977); see also EEOC Dec. No. 71-969, EEOC Dec.
(CCH)
6193 (Dec. 24, 1970) (noting that a white employee had standing to bring
charges under Title VII for racial insults aimed at African-American employees that
affected the white employee's work environment); EEOC Dec. No. 70-09, EEOC Dec.
(CCH) 6026 (July 8, 1969) (concluding that white employees had standing to file charge
of discrimination under Title VII for discrimination against African-American
coworkers); Rosman, supra note 70, at 605 (noting that "the courts have universally held
(based upon the Supreme Court's citation in Trafficante of Hackett v. McGuire Bros.) that
standing under Title VII extends to the full extent of Article III" (footnote omitted));
Torrey, supra note 13, at 376 (noting that "[c]ourts uniformly confer standing on plaintiffs
who claim a relatively abstract injury to themselves resulting from a work environment
tainted by discrimination against others"); Fisher, supra note 70, at 728-29 (noting that
"[c]ourts have held that whites have standing to enjoin discrimination against minority
groups under a variety of different theories, including the loss of interpersonal contacts
between members of the same or different races and hostile work environment claims"
(footnotes omitted)).
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standing in these cases usually base their conclusion on the Supreme
Court's reasoning in Trafficante v. MetropolitanLife Insurance Co."
In Trafficante, white tenants of a large apartment complex near
San Francisco brought suit against the complex owners, claiming that
the owners violated Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968-the
Fair Housing Act 91 -by "engaging in discriminatory housing practices
in violation of the Act, making [the complex] ... a 'white ghetto' and

depriving [the tenants] of their alleged right to live in a racially
integrated community." 9 The district court found that the white
tenants did not have standing to maintain an action under Title VIII
because they were attempting to assert that the denial of fair housing
rights of minorities deprived them of the benefits of living in an
interracial community, rather than asserting that they, as white
tenants, had been denied rights to purchase or rent real property
under the Fair Housing Act. 93 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district
court's decision, noting that its reading of the legislative history of
the Fair Housing Act showed a congressional intent to limit standing
to parties directly affected by the discriminatory practice and not to
include private third parties such as the white tenants. 4
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Ninth Circuit. 95
In doing so, it quoted approvingly the Third Circuit's decision in
Hackett v. McGuire Bros.,96 which interpreted the phrase "person
claiming to be aggrieved" 9 to allow a third party outside a protected
class to bring an action for discrimination in employment because

90. 409 U.S. 205 (1972); see, e.g., Stewart, 675 F.2d at 848-50; EEOC v. Mississippi
College, 626 F.2d 477, 482 (5th Cir. 1980); Bailey, 563 F.2d at 452-54; Waters v. Heublein,
Inc., 547 F.2d 466, 469-70 (9th Cir. 1976).
91. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1994). Title VIII provides in part that it is unlawful:
(a) To refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, or to refuse to
negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a
dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or
national origin.
(b) To discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of
sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in
connection therewith, because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or
national origin.
Id. § 3604.
92. Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 322 F. Supp. 352, 353 (N.D. Cal.), af'd,
446 F.2d 1158 (9th Cir. 1971), rev'd, 409 U.S. 205 (1972).
93. See id.
94. See Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 446 F.2d 1158, 1162-63 (9th Cir.
1971), rev'd, 409 U.S. 205 (1972).
95. See Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 212.
96. 445 F.2d 442 (3d Cir. 1971).
97. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1994).
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Title VII "showed 'a congressional intention to define standing as
broadly as is permitted by Article III of the Constitution.' "98 The
Court applied this conclusion to the claims under the Fair Housing
Act in Trafficante, determining that the standing provision of Title
VIII also was "broad and inclusive," and that the "injury to existing
[white] tenants by exclusion of minority persons from the apartment
complex is the loss of important benefits from interracial
associations." 99 Justice White concurred in the opinion, but noted
that without the Civil Rights Act of 1968100 "purporting to give all
those who are authorized to complain to the [Department of Housing
and Urban Development] the right also to sue in court,"'' he would
have had difficulty in granting the white plaintiffs standing under
Article III of the Constitution.' °
Justice White's observations about the Civil Rights Act of 1968
may have foreshadowed the concerns expressed by Judge Luttig in
Childress regarding whether Title VII should be read to provide as
broad an interpretation of standing as Title VIII. Nevertheless,
several courts that have confronted the issue of whether white
employees can bring an action for injuries allegedly suffered because
discrimination against African-American employees created an
adverse working environment have seized on Trafficante's approval
of Hackett's broad construction of Title VII standing. For example,
in EEOC v. T.I.M.E.-D.C. Freight,Inc.,'"' the Fifth Circuit held that
white truck drivers sustained injuries sufficient enough to be
aggrieved persons under Title VII because discrimination against
African-American truck drivers deprived the white drivers of a
personal right °to work in an environment unaffected by racial
discrimination."
Similarly, in Stewart v. Hannon, °5 the Seventh Circuit held that a
white female assistant principal had standing to bring an action
alleging discrimination against nonwhites regarding promotions
within her school system, even though she did not allege that the
discrimination precluded her from work in an integrated working
98. Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 209 (quoting Hackett, 445 F.2d at 446).
99. Id. at 209-10.
100. Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73, 73-92 (1968) (codified as amended in scattered

sections of 18,25 & 42 U.S.C.).
101. Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 212 (White, J., concurring). Justices Blackmun and
Powell joined Justice White in his concurrence. See id. (White, J.,
concurring).
102. See id. (White, J.,
concurring).
103. 659 F.2d 690 (5th Cir. Oct. 1981) (per curiam).
104. See id. at 692 n.2.
105. 675 F.2d 846 (7th Cir. 1982).
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environment. 10 In Stewart, seven assistant school principals-five
African-Americans, one Hispanic, and one white-brought suit
under Title VII against the Chicago Board of Education for racial
discrimination in the selection of school principals within the school
districtY07 Citing Trafficante, the Seventh Circuit held that Stewart
was an aggrieved person, concluding that her "complaint sufficiently
apprised the parties and the court of the claimed injury" because "the
exclusion of minority persons from a work environment can lead to
the loss of important benefits from interracial associations.' 0I s The
court concluded that Title VII standing should be interpreted as
broadly as Title VIII standing, as the Supreme Court had implied in
Trafficante, because both statutes aim to eliminate discrimination
against protected classes. 10 9

The Seventh Circuit in Stewart listed four reasons for its
conclusion. First, it noted that the statutory definition of an
aggrieved person under each statute is similar in that both provide
for the filing of charges with the federal agency responsible for
investigating claims-the EEOC under Title VII and the Department
of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD") under Title VIII.110
Second, the court held that the procedures for enforcement of Title
VII and Title VIII claims are "nearly identical," despite the fact that
the EEOC has public enforcement power while HUD does not."'
The EEOC's power, the court noted, was added in 1972112 to "expand
coverage of and increase compliance with the Act, and not to narrow
the class of complainants.' ' 13 Third, the court noted that Trafficante
endorsed the Hackett court's determination that standing under Title
VII should be applied as broadly as allowed under Article III of the
Constitution."4 Fourth, the court relied on several EEOC decisions
interpreting Title VII broadly to allow "white person[s], aggrieved by
discrimination against black persons at their place of work, to file
106. See id. at 848-50.
107. See id. at 847. The district court determined that the plaintiffs did not have
standing under Title VII because only Ruth Stewart, the white assistant principal, had
received a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC. See id. at 848. Because she was white,
however, the court held that Stewart was not an aggrieved party who could claim racial
discrimination. See id.
108. Id. at 850.
109. See id. at 849.
110. See id.

111. Id.
112. See Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 8(f), 86
Stat. 103, 109-10 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(g)(6) (1994)).
113. Stewart, 675 F.2d at 849.
114. See id.

1999]

TITLE VII STANDING

charges with the EEOC and to sue in court." 115 The court noted that
the EEOC decisions are not controlling but are entitled to deference
by a court considering the same issue.116
Other circuits also have relied on the Trafficante interpretation

of Title VII standing in concluding that white plaintiffs may have
standing to bring an action for the creation of a hostile working
environment because of discrimination against blacks. In Clayton v.
White Hall School District,117 a white female cafeteria manager in the
White Hall School District moved outside of the school district but

kept her child enrolled in a school within the district. 118 A fellow
school district employee-an African-American male-who also

lived outside the school district attempted to enroll his child in a
White Hall school." 9

The school district refused to allow the

African-American employee to enroll his child, citing a policy
prohibiting the children of employees from attending a White Hall
school when the employee lived outside the district. 20 The school

district subsequently began enforcing this policy and told the white
female employee that her child could no longer attend a White Hall
school.' The female worker brought a Title VII claim against the
school district for the creation of a hostile working environment
permeated by racial discrimination."z The school district argued that
the white employee did not have standing to bring a racially-based
hostile environment claim.' 3 The Eighth Circuit, citing Trafficante
and other circuit court decisions, 24 noted that standing under Title
115. Id. (citing EEOC Dec. No. 72-0591, EEOC Dec. (CCH) 6314 (Dec. 21, 1971);
EEOC Dec. No. 71-969, EEOC Dec. (CCH) 6193 (Dec. 24, 1970); EEOC Dec. No. 7009, EEOC Dec. (CCH) 6026 (July 8,1969)).
116. See id. (citing General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141-46 (1976)); see also
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971) (noting that guidelines
interpreting Title VII that are adopted by the EEOC, as the enforcing agency, are
"entitled to great deference").
117. 875 F.2d 676 (8th Cir. 1989).
118. See id. at 678.
119. See id.
120. See id.
121. See id.
122. See id.
123. See id.
124. The court cited Waters v. Heublein, Inc., 547 F.2d 466 (9th Cir. 1976), in addition
to Trafficante. See Clayton, 875 F.2d at 679. In Waters, the plaintiff-a white femalebrought Title VII charges for sex, race, and national origin discrimination because of
alleged discriminatory acts her employer had taken against her because of her sex and
against certain coworkers because they were African-American or Hispanic. See Waters,
547 F.2d at 467-69. The Ninth Circuit stated that Waters was "logically indistinguishable"
from Trafficante in that "[the] analysis of the standing question applies with equal force to
actions brought under Title VII, the purpose and structure of which is 'functionally
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VII does not apply just to minority groups but is "dependent upon
whether the plaintiff is a person claiming to be aggrieved by such
discrimination."" Because the white employee had an "interest in a
work environment free of racial discrimination [that] is clearly within
the zone of interest protected by Title VII," the court held that she
had standing to bring a Title VII action for discrimination against
minority employees. 26
Until Childress, the Fourth Circuit had not addressed the
question of whether white plaintiffs have standing to bring a Title VII
hostile environment claim for discrimination against AfricanAmerican employees or whether male plaintiffs can bring a similar
action for discrimination against female employees. In International
Woodworkers of America v. Chesapeake Bay Plywood Corp.,127
however, the Fourth Circuit concluded that a white male union
member could not bring a Title VII discrimination action as a class
representative for African-American or female employees.2 8 The
union officer, along with the woodworker's union and two other union
officials, sued individually and as representatives of all blacks and
females who may have been victims of discriminatory employment
actions by Chesapeake Bay.129 The court rejected the white male union
officer's class representative and individual complaints, noting that as a
class representative, "he obviously does not possess the same interests
nor suffer the same injuries as the class members he seeks to represent
...[and thus] cannot be a class representative in this case."' 30
Similarly, the court noted that the plaintiff could not bring an
individual Title VII action because he "could not conceivably
have
131
suffered personally the injuries alleged in the complaint."'
identical' to the fair housing legislation construed in Trafficante." Id. at 469. The court
noted that: (1) the benefits of interracial association free from disharmony were equally
as strong in employment as in housing; (2) the differing enforcement powers of HUD
under Title VIII and the EEOC under Title VII were the result of later amendments to
Title VII to ensure greater enforcement and did not show a Congressional intent to
"narrow the class of plaintiffs who might bring suit" under Title VII; and (3) the court's
application of Trafficante did not create new law but was consistent with the Trafficante
interpretation of who is an aggrieved person under both Title VII and Title VIII. Id. at
469-70. As a result, the court held that Waters had standing under Title VII to bring
racial or national origin discrimination claims. See id. at 469.
125. Clayton, 875 F.2d at 679.
126. Id. at 680.
127. 659 F.2d 1259 (4th Cir. 1981).
128. See id. at 1270-71.
129. See id. at 1261.
130. Id. at 1269.
131. Id. at 1270. The court also noted that the white union employee could not bring a
Title VII action as an individual plaintiff because he did not "allege that he has been
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883

In Childress, on the other hand, the white male police officers
alleged that they had been injured as a result of the creation of a hostile

work environment due to the discriminatory conduct against their
African-American and female coworkers, not that those coworkers
allegedly were injured. 3 2 The complaint by the white male officers in
Childress formed the basis for the district court's analysis that the
officers could not establish a hostile environment because of same-sex
harassment. 133 The district court interpreted the officers' allegations to
mean that they claimed injury because of harassment by their
supervisor, who also was a white male. 134 At the time of its decision,
the district court noted that "[t]he Fourth Circuit has not yet decided
the same-sex issue, but the prevailing view is that Title VII addresses
only discrimination between the sexes.' 13 Since that time, the Fourth
retaliated against for his efforts in pursuing the civil rights claims of others," and thus
"[t]here is nothing to suggest a possible claim that he has been denied the benefits of
interracial associations [as in Trafficante]." Id. at 1270-71. Interestingly, although the
Childresspanel focused on Trafficante in holding that the white male officers had standing
to bring a Title VII hostile environment action, see Childress v. City of Richmond, 120
F.3d 476, 480-81 (4th Cir. 1997), reh'g en banc granted,opinion vacated, ruling affd by an
equally divided court, 134 F.3d 1205 (4th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 2322 (1998),
the officers-like the union employee in International Woodworkers-did not claim
denial of interracial association benefits, which was the basis for the Court's conclusion in
Trafficante that the white plaintiffs had Title VII standing, see Brief of Appellant at 16-20,
Childress,134 F.3d 1205 (4th Cir. 1998) (No. 96-1585).
132. Professor Torrey notes that in cases such as InternationalWoodworkers,
plaintiffs, generally seeking class action representative status, do not assert any
injury to themselves from the discrimination. Therefore, they do not meet the
basic article III requirement that injury be caused by the defendant and
redressable by litigation at issue. These cases are distinguishable from work
environment standing decisions since the plaintiffs failed to claim that the
employer's discrimination against others resulted in an injury to plaintiffs-only
that the employer discriminated against others. If the plaintiffs had asserted
their own work environment injury, or if the courts had acknowledged other
types of injury resulting from the employer's improper discrimination against
others, standing would have been found under this theory.
Torrey, supranote 13, at 381.
133. See Childress,907 F. Supp. 934, 939-40 (E.D. Va. 1995), affd in part,rev'd in part,
120 F.3d 476 (4th Cir. 1997), reh'g en banc granted, opinion vacated, ruling affd by an
equally divided court, 134 F.3d 1205 (4th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 2322 (1998).
134. See id. at 939. The district court, using the same-sex analogy, also denied the
white male officers standing as to their race-based hostile environment claim, noting that
"the civil rights laws permit no claim for same-race discrimination where the only
allegation is that a supervisor is biased in the plaintiff's favor." Id. at 940. As discussed
infra notes 157-70 and accompanying text, the district court's same-sex reasoning-and its
application of that reasoning to same-race discrimination claims-was questionable and,
as the plaintiffs argued in their brief before the Fourth Circuit on appeal, "curious." See
Brief of Appellant at 16, Childress (No. 96-1585).
135. Childress,907 F. Supp. at 939 (citing Garcia v. Elf Atochem N. Am., 28 F.3d 446,
452 (5th Cir. 1994); Benekritis v. Johnson, 882 F. Supp. 521, 525 (D.S.C. 1995)).
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Circuit has successively ruled that: (1) a hostile environment claim
under Title VII "does not lie where both the alleged harassers and the
'
victim are heterosexuals of the same sex;"136
(2) because alleged
sexual discrimination by one male against another "was not
sufficiently severe or pervasive ...to establish a prima facie case of
sexual harassment under Title VII," the court did not need to
determine whether the discrimination was directed at the plaintiff
because of his sex; 137 and (3) a "claim under Title VII for same-sex
'hostile work environment' harassment may lie where the perpetrator
of the sexual harassment is homosexual. 1 3 The Fourth Circuit's
decisions that a same-sex hostile environment claim could lie when
the discriminator was homosexual falls between the holdings of other
circuits. The Fifth Circuit, in Garcia v. Elf Atochem North
America,'39 has stated that same-sex harassment claims are never
actionable. 4 ' The Seventh Circuit, on the other hand, held in Doe v.
City of Belleville 4 ' that sexual harassment in the workplace is always
actionable 2regardless of the gender of the harasser and harassed
14
employee.
136. McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191, 1195 (4th Cir.
1996). The court specifically did not preclude addressing other same-sex harassment
claims, noting that its holding did not "purport to rule out claims of discrimination by
adverse employment decisions ...involving only same-sex heterosexual actors ...[n]or
...
reach any form of same-sex discrimination claim where either victim or oppressor, or
both, are homosexual or bisexual." Id. at 1195 n.4.
137. Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 77 F.3d 745, 754 (4th Cir. 1996).
Although Judge Niemeyer wrote the opinion for the court, he concluded in a separate
part of his opinion, which was not joined by the two other judges, that "sexual harassment
of a male employee, whether by another male or by a female, may be actionable under
Title VII if the basis for the harassment is because the employee is a man." Id. at 752.
138. Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am., 99 F.3d 138, 141 (4th Cir. 1996). For an extensive
discussion of federal circuit decisions regarding Title VII and same-sex harassment issues
at the time of the district court's decision in Childress, see Dale Carpenter, Same-Sex
Sexual HarassmentUnder Title VII, 37 S.TEx. L. REv. 699, 713-25 (1996).
139. 28 F.3d 446 (5th Cir. 1994).
140. See id.
at 452. Commentators have suggested that the court's statement in Garcia
was dicta rather than a distinct holding that same-sex sexual harassment is not actionable.
See Ramona L. Paetzold, Same-Sex Sexual Harassment: Can It be Sex-Related for
Purposes of Title VII?, 1 EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMPLOYMENT POL'Y J.25, 30 n.36 (1997)

(indicating that "[s]ome district courts have interpreted Garcia's prohibition as mere
dicta"); Amy Shahan, Comment, Determining Whether Title VII Provides a Cause of
Action for Same-Sex Sexual Harassment,48 BAYLOR L. REV. 507, 513 (1996) (arguing

that the court's statement was dicta). But see Richard F. Storrow, Same-Sex Sexual
HarassmentClaims after Oncale: Defining the Boundariesof Actionable Conduct, 47 AM.

U. L. REv. 677, 694 n.75 (1998) (arguing that the Garcia court's decision was not dicta
because the court relied on not recognizing same-sex claims as one of its grounds for
rejecting the plaintiff's claim).
141. 119 F.3d 563 (7th Cir. 1997), vacated, 118 S. Ct. 1183 (1998).
142 See id. at 574.
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The Supreme Court's recent decision in Oncale v. Sundowner
Offshore Services, Inc.43 also merits review for its possible effects on
Childress. In Oncale, the Court faced the issue of whether Title VII
provided protection against workplace sexual harassment when the
"harasser and the harassed employee are of the same sex."'" The
plaintiff, a male worker on an oil rig in the Gulf of Mexico, sued his
employer under Title VII for sexual harassment allegedly caused by
his coworkers and supervisor, all of whom were also male. 45 The
plaintiff alleged that he was subjected to sexually humiliating acts and
taunts by his fellow employees because of his sex and that this
146
conduct constituted discrimination against him under Title VII.
The Fifth Circuit, following its holding in Garcia, refused to
recognize that the plaintiff had a cause of action under Title VII
because both he and his alleged harassers were of the same sex. 47
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that "nothing in Title VII
necessarily bars a claim of discrimination 'because of... sex' merely
because the plaintiff and the defendant (or the person charged with
acting on behalf of the defendant) are of the same sex."'1 48 In
reaching its decision, the Court noted the various positions of the
federal circuits on same-sex harassment hostile environment claims
and the conclusion of some of these circuits that Congress most likely
did not consider "male-on-male sexual harassment ... the principal

evil ... when it enacted Title VII.' 149 The Court stated that its
holding on same-sex harassment would not create a "general civility
code for the American workplace" because workplace harassment
did not automatically connote discrimination simply because of
sexual content. 150 Instead, to be actionable, harassment would have
to entail "behavior so objectively offensive as to alter the 'conditions'
of the victim's employment."'' In a situation in which a same-sex
harassment plaintiff can show that the alleged discriminatory conduct
was "because of sex" and did not involve just sexual connotations,
however, the plaintiff should be able to bring a Title VII

143. 118 S. Ct. 998 (1998).
144. Id. at 1000.
145. See id. at 1000-01.
146. See id. at 1001.
147. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 83 F.3d 118, 120-21 (5th Cir.
1996), rev'd, 118 S. Ct. 998 (1998).
148. Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1001-02.
149. Id. at 1002.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 1003.
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discrimination action. 152 The Court did not explain what "because of
sex" meant. In his concurrence, Justice Thomas emphasized that "in
every sexual harassment case, the plaintiff must plead and ultimately
prove Title VII's statutory requirement that there be discrimination
'because of... sex.' "15 That Justice Thomas, and Justice Scalia for
the majority, noted that a same-sex plaintiff must always prove
discrimination because of sex and not just sexually offensive
conduct 54 indicates that the same-sex plaintiff will have a difficult
evidentiary burden to succeed in a Title VII action.
The combination of the Court's decision in Oncale and the
analysis for determining a hostile environment established by the
Court in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson 55 and Harris v. Forklift
Systems, Inc.156 casts doubt on the validity of Childress and its denial
of standing based on same-sex harassment. The district court denied
the white male police officers standing by first finding that the
officers were not within a protected class because they were the same
sex as their supervisor. 57 After Oncale, however, this reason cannot
be the sole basis for denying standing to bring a Title VII hostile
environment action. To deny standing for a same-sex discrimination
claim, a court would have to find that the plaintiffs-such as the
white male officers in Childress-could not demonstrate that they
15
had been injured by discriminatory actions taken "because of" sex. 8
Whether the officers' alleged injuries were the result of harassment
directed toward the female employees because of their sex would be
a question of the sufficiency of the male officers' evidence and
whether the hostile environment standard of Harris had been
encountered. They could not be denied standing, however, simply
because they were the same sex as their supervisor.
The primary claim of the white male police officers in Childress
was for disparate impact discrimination because of a hostile
environment created by the alleged discrimination against their

152. See id. at 1002.
153. Id. at 1003 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994)).
154. See id. at 1002.
155. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
156. 510 U.S. 17 (1993); see also supra text accompanying note 83 (discussing the
relationship of Meritor and Harris).
157. See Childress v. City of Richmond, 907 F. Supp. 934, 939 (E.D. Va. 1995) affd in
part, rev'd in part, 120 F.3d 476 (4th Cir. 1997), reh'g en banc granted, opinion vacated,
ruling aff'd by an equally divided court, 134 F.3d 1205 (4th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 118 S.
Ct. 2322 (1998).
158. See Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1002.
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African-American and female coworkers. 9 As such, it may have
been more appropriate to analyze their claims using the Meritor and
Harris hostile environment standard-that is, whether a reasonable
person would find the alleged workplace conduct to be "'sufficiently
severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment
and create an abusive working environment.' "160 This analysis would
have involved an evaluation of, inter alia, the frequency, intensity,
and threatening nature of the conduct and161its potential interference
with the plaintiff employees' performance.
According to the district court and the en banc court, the white
male officers failed to establish standing for either a sexual or racial
hostile environment claim or an intentional sexual or racial
discrimination claim primarily because they were the same sex as
their supervisor. 62 The same-sex issue, as well as the district court's
remarks that the white male officers were complaining about
discriminatory acts from which they reportedly benefited, 63 was
emphasized in the City of Richmond's appellate brief as grounds for
denying standing to the officers. 64 The white male officers argued,
however, that discriminatory acts directed toward their minority
coworkers created a hostile working environment, which reportedly
led to potential safety problems in that the minority officers would
not support their fellow white male officers in the field. 65 This
secondary discrimination, and the resultant safety concerns, were the
injuries that the officers alleged they suffered as a result of the
creation of a hostile environment. 66 Whether this type of injury was
sufficient to establish standing to bring a Title VII hostile
environment claim, and whether the white male officers-if granted
standing-could show that a hostile environment existed under the
Meritor and Harrisanalysis, were not fully addressed by the Fourth
Circuit panel or the en bane court.
As noted previously, several courts have granted standing to
159. See Brief of Appellant at 17, Childress(No. 96-1585).
160. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (quoting Meritor Say. Bank v.
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986)).
161. See id. at 23.
162 See Childress, 907 F. Supp. at 939-40. The district court used the same-sex
analogy to deny the white officers standing to bring a race-based hostile environment
claim, commenting that because the nine white officers were of the same race as their
supervisor, "the race-based claim of all of the officers suffers from the same defects as the
male officers' gender claim." Id. at 940.
163. See id. at 939.
164. See Brief of Appellee at 12-14, Childress (No. 96-1585).
165. See Brief of Appellant at 17, Childress (No. 96-1585).
166. See id. at 19.
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non-minority employee plaintiffs to assert Title VII claims based on
discrimination against minority employees. 167 In Clayton v. White
Hall School District,16s however, the Eighth Circuit concluded that
even though a white employee had standing to bring a Title VII
action for injuries caused by a hostile working environment created
by discrimination against a fellow minority employee,169 she "failed to
make a showing sufficient to establish a hostile working environment
claim. "o The Clayton court noted that the white plaintiff had
established that she was within the "zone of interest" required to
obtain standing under Title VII and Article II1171 by claiming that a
"hostile working environment permeated by racial discrimination
17
[that] caused her severe emotional and psychological distress.
The court reached this conclusion by referring-as the Fourth Circuit
panel did-to the broad interpretation of the term "aggrieved
person" established by the Supreme Court in Trafficante and to its
own precedent that "'Title

VII ...is to be accorded a liberal

construction in order to carry out the purpose of Congress to
eliminate the inconvenience, unfairness and humiliation of racial
discrimination.' "17 The Clayton court then evaluated the white
plaintiff's hostile environment claim based on the evidence she
presented regarding one instance of racial discrimination and
determined that this single incident was insufficient to meet the
requirement that discriminatory acts pervade the workplace.'74
This two-step analysis by the Clayton court-determining
whether a non-minority plaintiff has standing to pursue a hostile
167. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
168. 875 F.2d 676 (8th Cir. 1989).
169. See id. at 680; see also supra notes 117-26 and accompanying text (discussing the
facts and holding in Clayton).
170. Clayton, 875 F.2d at 680.
171. See supra notes 68-81 and accompanying text (describing the requirements for a
claimant to establish standing under Title VII and Article III of the Constitution).
172. Clayton, 875 F.2d at 679. As the Supreme Court noted in Harris v. Forklift
Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993), however, conduct creating a hostile environment does
not have to
leadI to a nervous breakdown. A discriminatorily abusive work environment,
even one that does not seriously affect employees' psychological well-being, can
and often will detract from employees' job performance, discourage employees
from remaining on the job, or keep them from advancing in their careers.... So
long as the environment would reasonably be perceived, and is perceived, as
hostile or abusive, there is no need for it also to be psychologically injurious.
Id. at 22 (citation omitted).
173. Clayton, 875 F.2d at 679 (quoting Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d
421, 425 (8th Cir. 1970)).
174. See id. at 680.
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environment claim for minority discrimination and then determining
whether a hostile environment exists-appears to be a more
appropriate way of addressing issues such as those raised in Childress
than the analysis employed by the district court and the en banc court
in that case. As the Fourth Circuit panel noted, the initial problem in
Childress was one of standing by non-minority employees to bring a
hostile environment claim when discrimination is directed at minority
employees, not whether persons have standing when they are of the
same sex or race as the person allegedly conducting the
discrimination. 175 In addition, the Supreme Court's decision in
Oncale raises serious questions about the automatic preclusion of
standing for plaintiffs of the same sex or race as the alleged
discriminator.1 6 The initial analysis in a case such as Childress,
therefore, would seem to be governed by precedent interpreting the
expansiveness of Title VII standing. Based on Trafficante and other
federal cases, one could argue that the Fourth Circuit panel was
correct in granting standing to the white male officers to bring the
hostile environment claim. Once standing is granted, the second
stage of the Clayton analysis would determine whether the hostile
environment claim was valid.
To determine whether a valid hostile environment exists, a court
would apply the analysis established by the Supreme Court in Meritor
and Harris-whether, under all the circumstances, a reasonable
person would find the conduct hostile or abusive. Applying this test
to the white male officers' claim in Childress, it is questionable
whether the officers presented sufficient evidence to establish the
existence of a hostile environment. The comments made by the
white male officers' supervisor, although degrading and offensive,
appeared to have occurred on only a few occasions and were not
repeated after the officers complained to their superiors. 7 It is not
certain that these discriminatory acts occurred with such frequency
that they would rise to the level of being "severe or pervasive enough
7
to create an objectively hostile or abusive working environment.'
It is also uncertain whether this conduct itself, or the discrimination

175. See Childress v. City of Richmond, 120 F.3d 476, 480-81 (4th Cir. 1997), reh'g en
banc granted,opinion vacated, ruling affd by an equally divided court, 134 F.3d 1205 (4th
Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 2322 (1998).
176. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 118 S. Ct. 998 (1998); see also
supranotes 143-54 and accompanying text (discussing Oncale).
177. See Brief of Appellee at 13-15, Childress (No. 96-1585); Brief of Appellant at 8-9,
Childress (No. 96-1585).
178. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17,21 (1993).
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and safety problems allegedly caused by the conduct,179 created a
"physically threatening or humiliating" situation that "unreasonably
interfere[d] with [the plaintiffs'] work performance.""
Neither the
district court nor the en banc court reviewed these circumstances,
which Harris suggests should be addressed in evaluating hostile
environment claims.8
The absence of a Meritor and Harrisor a Clayton analysis from
the district court and en banc court opinions in Childress does not
indicate that the Fourth Circuit will fail to assiduously evaluate

hostile environment claims under Title VII in the future. The court
has in other instances applied the factors identified in Harris to find
the existence of a hostile working environment. 1' 2 What is apparent
from the en banc decision is that there does not appear to be a
majority of the court willing to extend the scope of Title VII standing
to certain "unprotected" classes of employees as other federal
circuits and, arguably, the Supreme Court have done." 3 This
hesitancy may limit future claims by persons such as white male
employees and may affect the "dominant purpose of [Title VII] ... to

root out discrimination in employment."'a84
DAVID B. HAWLEY

179. See Brief of Appellant at 18, Childress (No. 96-1585).
180. Harris,510 U.S. at 23.
181. See id.

182. See, e.g., Hartsell v. Duplex Prods., Inc., 123 F.3d 766, 772-73 (4th Cir. 1997)
(applying Harris to determine whether a female salesperson was subject to sexual
harassment that created a hostile working environment); Sasaki v. Class, 92 F.3d 232, 242
(4th Cir. 1996) (evaluating the district court's application of the hostile environment
analysis from Harris); Spicer v. Virginia, 66 F.3d 705, 709-10 (4th Cir. 1995) (applying
Harrisin determining whether a female prison employee was subject to a hostile working
environment).
183. The Supreme Court has not directly addressed the question of whether nonminority employees have standing to bring a Title VII action based on discrimination
against fellow minority employees. As noted previously, see supra notes 95-102 and
accompanying text, the Court has written approvingly, however, of circuit court decisions
broadening Title VII standing to include such claims.
184. EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54,77 (1984).

